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Consistent individual differences in human
social learning strategies
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Social learning has allowed humans to build up extensive cultural repertoires, enabling them
to adapt to a wide variety of environmental and social conditions. However, it is unclear which
social learning strategies people use, especially in social contexts where their payoffs depend
on the behaviour of others. Here we show experimentally that individuals differ in their social
learning strategies and that they tend to employ the same learning strategy irrespective of the
interaction context. Payoff-based learners focus on their peers’ success, while decision-based
learners disregard payoffs and exclusively focus on their peers’ past behaviour. These
individual differences may be of considerable importance for cultural evolution. By means of a
simple model, we demonstrate that groups harbouring individuals with different learning
strategies may be faster in adopting technological innovations and can be more efﬁcient
through successful role differentiation. Our study highlights the importance of individual
variation for human interactions and sheds new light on the dynamics of cultural evolution.
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H
uman success in colonizing nearly all terrestrial habitats
of our planet was facilitated by our social nature1,2.
Humans excel in collective action are able to cooperate in
social dilemmas and to employ high degrees of group
coordination and cooperation to solve adaptive problems. The
transmission of information between individuals through social
learning was a key factor for the spread of humans across the
whole planet1. Such cultural transmission has led to the
accumulation of huge amounts of adaptive information in very
little time. It has been argued that social learning leads to a
parallel inheritance system giving rise to a process that is in many
ways analogous to genetic evolution3–6. The dynamics and
outcome of this process of cultural evolution is to a large extent
determined by the rules that govern the transmission of cultural
information between individuals, that is, the social learning
mechanisms that people use. Several social learning strategies
have been described that may each be adaptive under particular
circumstances7–12. A social learning strategy can specify under
which circumstances to pay attention to social information; which
individuals to choose as target for collecting information; which
type of information to gather from these individuals; and how to
use this information as guidance for future behaviour8,13.
Prominent examples of social learning strategies are ‘frequency-
based learning’ (for example, to conform to a local
majority3,12,14–16), ‘payoff-based learning’ (to imitate the
behaviour of peers who achieved high payoffs in the recent
past3,17–20), or ‘prestige-based learning’ (to imitate or follow the
advice of high-status individuals such as leaders or teachers18–20).
Empirical evidence from the ﬁeld suggests that these learning
strategies do indeed affect the spread of behaviour in human
groups21,22. The results of such investigations are corroborated by
evidence from controlled laboratory studies, which indicate that
people attend to the frequencies of their peers’ behaviour, as well
as to the payoffs associated with it23–29. In addition, there are
indications that the extent to which people resort to social
information depends on factors like task difﬁculty, conﬁdence in
their own information30 and environmental variability31.
Experimental results suggest that individuals differ in the extent
to which they rely on social information when making decisions
under uncertainty24,28, and vary in their tendency to conform to
behaviour of the majority26.
As yet, there is no strong evidence that individuals differ with
respect to the type of social information that they rely on in
making decisions. This is not surprising, since experimental
studies of human social information use have predominantly
focused on the spread of technological innovations that are
mainly relevant in non-social contexts. When attempting to
acquire technological know-how, individuals almost exclusively
use payoff-based learning (by copying behaviour of successful
individuals) when explicitly presented with a choice between
multiple social learning strategies28. Finding the adequate
behaviour in a social setting is quite a different task, which
might require different learning strategies. Social ‘know-how’
differs from technological know-how in that the payoffs of the
various alternatives do not only depend on the external
environment but also on the behaviour of others in the
population. When having to choose among alternatives in a
non-social setting, the information obtained from others is
mainly useful for obtaining a more accurate estimate of the
payoffs of these alternatives in a noisy world. In a social setting,
these payoffs reﬂect the behaviour of others. As a consequence,
social learning gets a new dimension, namely acquiring
information on the distribution of behavioural tendencies in the
population. The importance of such frequency information
strongly depends on the type of social interaction. Here we
study social learning in various social interactions with different
signatures. This way we get a more general impression of whether
and how social learning differs between technological and social
contexts. Moreover, the inclusion of different types of social
context allows us to investigate whether individuals are consistent
across those contexts.
To obtain a better understanding of human social learning in
both social and non-social settings, we designed an experiment.
Subjects were distributed in groups of eight individuals and
experienced four interaction contexts in sequence: a best choice
situation (BC; where one of the options yielded a higher payoff on
average, irrespective of the behaviour of the other members), a
social dilemma (SD; where cooperation is costly to the individual
but beneﬁcial for the group), a coordination game (CO; where it
is favourable to follow the behaviour of the majority) and an
evasion game (EV; where it is favourable to deviate from the
behaviour of the majority). Payoffs were noisy, so that it required
several trials to ﬁnd the best option. Before making a decision, all
subjects were allowed to request up to six pieces of information
about the behaviours and payoffs of their peers, at a small cost
(see Methods for details). The information available about each
peer included the previous decision, the payoff associated with the
previous decision and the total payoff acquired in the current
context. We evaluate social learning strategies by tracking the
types of information requests that subjects made and by
investigating how these requests inﬂuenced their behaviour.
We demonstrate that individuals differ substantially and
consistently with respect to their social learning strategies. Some
strongly rely on social information in making their decisions,
whereas others tend to learn individually. Those individuals
making use of social information differ in the type of information
they are interested in: some individuals only focus on the
decisions of their group members (thereby neglecting payoff-
related information), whereas others consistently request infor-
mation about both decisions and the payoffs that were associated
with them. We repeated our primary experiment in a larger
follow-up study to get an impression of the robustness and
replicability of our results. Finally, we built a simple model for
decision-making in groups to investigate whether individual
differences in social learning strategies will affect the direction
and outcome of cultural evolution.
Results
Dynamics of behaviour and social information use. In the
course of time, the behaviour in all groups converged to a Nash
equilibrium of the game describing the social context (Fig. 1, top
row, broken lines), indicating that subjects adjusted their beha-
viour according to the underlying payoff structure (see Methods
for details). The availability of social information was associated
with a faster adoption of the superior option in the best choice
context and the dominant strategy in the social dilemma game
(Supplementary Fig. 1). Subjects frequently made use of costly
social information (Fig. 1; bottom row; the fraction of decisions
preceded by costly request for information was BC: 0.23, SD: 0.25,
CO: 0.21 and EV: 0.31). Information requests decreased over
time, presumably because there is less need for subjects to adjust
their behaviour once their group has approached equilibrium.
Individuals usually requested information about only the previous
decision (Fig. 1, red bars) or the combination of the previous
decision and the associated payoff (Fig. 1, light blue bars) of their
peers. In more than 80% of these cases, requested information
entirely consisted of either of those two types; the previous
decision of six of their peers or the combination of the previous
decision and payoffs of three of their peers (also adding up to the
maximally allowed six pieces of information). These types
of information requests are consistent with frequency-based
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learning strategies (such as conformism) and payoff-based
learning strategies, respectively. On average, subjects requested
social information more often when their own previous decision
yielded low payoffs (Supplementary Fig. 2). Also, individuals
tended to change their behaviour when information on the
behaviour and payoffs of others indicated that alternative beha-
viour yielded a higher payoff (Supplementary Fig. 3; consistent
with payoff-based learning). Reactions to information on the
frequencies of peers’ behaviour depended on the interaction
context (see Supplementary Fig. 4). In the best choice context, the
proportion of information requests including requests for payoffs
(0.61) was signiﬁcantly higher than in the social contexts (SD:
0.40, CO: 0.26, EV: 0.33; Tukey contrasts between effect estimates
of the factor ‘context’ in a generalized linear model: n¼ 9728
decisions; Po0.001). Subjects requested total payoffs almost
exclusively in the last round (Fig. 1, dark green, light green, yellow
and orange bars), presumably out of curiosity to compare their
own performance with that of others.
Individual variation in social learning strategies. Subjects
strongly varied in their reliance on social learning. In each con-
text, about 20% of all subjects never requested information
(Fig. 2a). In contrast, some other individuals based most of their
decisions on information about their peers.
The subjects also differed strongly in the degree to which they
requested information on payoffs (Fig. 2b). While the overall
fraction of information requests that included requests for payoffs
was intermediate in each context (see above), the underlying
individual behaviour was surprisingly extreme. For each context
separately, we found that most subjects can be categorized in two
largely distinct groups with consistent behaviour: those who
rarely include payoff information in their requests and those who
do this in the majority of cases (Fig. 2b).
Consistency of social learning strategies. For each of the four
contexts, we categorized subjects’ reliance on social learning as
low or high when they requested social information in less or
more than 25% of the cases, respectively. This cutoff point divi-
ded the data in two roughly equal portions for each context (for
example, Fig. 2a). Individuals were signiﬁcantly more consistent
in their reliance on social information (that is, either categorized
as ‘high’ or as ‘low’ in all contexts) than expected based on
independence between contexts (Fig. 3a). Subjects showed a
similar consistency with regard to the type of social information
they relied on; many of them either strongly relied on payoff-
information across all contexts (Fig. 3b, red bar) or hardly relied
on payoff-information at all (Fig. 3b, blue bar; an individual’s
reliance on payoffs was categorized as ‘low’ or ‘high’, depending
on whether her information requests included payoffs in less or
more than 50% of the cases). The abundance of these consistent
individuals was much higher than expected based on indepen-
dence between contexts (subjects with consistent high and low
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Figure 1 | Change in behaviour and information requests in the course of time. (a) Change in the relative frequency of cases that option A was
chosen for each context (sixteen replicate groups in grey, averages in colour). Over time, replicate groups approach a Nash equilibrium of the games
(broken lines, arrows; option B yielded a higher payoff than A in both the best choice and the social dilemma context). (b) Counts of combinations of
information types requested in corresponding rounds. Before making their decision, subjects could collect six pieces of costly information about their
peer group members. For each peer, available information was his decision in the previous round, his payoff in the previous round and his total
payoff obtained in the present context. Requests for payoffs (and associated decisions; light blue bars) prevail in the best choice context and occur regularly
in the social contexts; requests only involving recent decisions (red bars) prevail in the social contexts and occur regularly in the best choice context.
With the exception of the ﬁnal round (where subjects often request information on total payoffs) other types of requests are very rare.
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reliance on payoffs occurring 6.13 and 2.77 times more than
expected on the basis of independence, respectively; w2¼ 9.811,
n¼ 128, d.f.¼ 1, P¼ 0.002, and w2¼ 7.093, n¼ 128, d.f.¼ 1,
P¼ 0.008). Another large fraction of subjects employed a speciﬁc
ﬂexible social learning strategy, with high reliance on payoffs in
the (non-social) best choice context and low reliance on payoffs
in the other (social) contexts—this is the social learning beha-
viour that one might intuitively expect (see introduction). How-
ever, these ‘sensible switchers’ are not more abundant than
expected based on independence between contexts (w2¼ 0.319,
n¼ 128, d.f.¼ 1, P¼ 0.572). We did not observe signiﬁcant dif-
ferences between types of social learning strategies and perfor-
mance in the experiment, as reﬂected in total earnings (Tukey
contrasts on a linear model: n¼ 128, P40.121 for comparisons
between the three types of social learners highlighted in Fig. 3b).
Robustness and replicability. To check for the robustness and
replicability of the results obtained, we conducted a follow-up
experiment that shared the same general setup with the primary
experiment but differed in various aspects (group size was ﬁve
instead of eight, individuals were allowed to view only four pieces
of information per round, the payoff matrices were slightly
different, the stochastic component in the payoffs was increased;
see Methods for details). In general, our follow-up experiment
conﬁrmed all main results of the primary experiment. As in the
primary experiment, groups approached the Nash equilibria of
the one-shot version of the games in all four contexts
(Supplementary Fig. 5). Again, most requests were for either a
combination of previous decision and associated payoffs or for
previous decisions only. In all four contexts, subjects tended to
request information more often in the follow-up experiment
(ANOVAs; BC: P¼ 0.035; SD: Po0.001; CO: P¼ 0.071; EV:
Po0.001, n¼ 328 for each test). Since the stochasticity in payoffs
was higher in the follow-up experiment, this ﬁnding is in line
with results reported in the literature (for example refs 30,31).
As in the primary experiment, subjects varied strongly in the
extent to which they based their decisions on social information
(Supplementary Fig. 6). When requesting information, individuals
again differed substantially in the type of information they were
interested in; some always included payoff information in their
requests, whereas others ignored payoff information altogether.
These differences among individuals were even more pronounced
in the follow-up experiment than in the primary experiment.
As in our primary experiment, we ﬁnd (Supplementary Fig. 7)
that the fraction of individuals that was consistent in their social
information use is signiﬁcantly larger than expected on the basis
of independence (w2¼ 29.551, n¼ 200, d.f.¼ 1, Po0.001). This is
also the case for individuals’ consistency in reliance on payoffs
(w2¼ 13.673, n¼ 200, d.f.¼ 1, Po0.001). In other words, as in
our primary experiment, many individuals were consistent in
either strongly or weakly relying on social information, and many
individuals were consistent in the type of social information they
requested.
Implications of individual variation for cultural evolution. Our
experimental results indicate that there are strong and consistent
individual differences in social learning strategies. But does this
individual variation matter? To address this question, we devel-
oped a simple model of cultural evolution in which individuals
interact in small groups and are allowed to update their behaviour
by either payoff-based learning (by imitating peers who achieved
high payoffs) or frequency-based learning (by imitating the
majority). We imposed two conditions: a homogeneous
population, in which all individuals updated their strategy by
payoff-based learning or frequency-based learning with a 50–50
probability, and a heterogeneous population, in which half of the
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Figure 2 | Variation among subjects in their reliance on social information and their reliance on payoff information. (a) Distribution of individuals’
reliance on social learning in decision making, measured as the fraction of decisions in which subjects chose to collect peer information. (b) Distribution
of individuals’ reliance on payoffs in social learning, measured as the fraction of requests for peer information that included previous payoffs. All
distributions are broad and strongly overdispersed when compared with binomial expectations: individuals strongly vary in their reliance on social learning,
but even more strongly so with respect to their reliance on payoff information.
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individuals in a group always updated based on payoffs, and the
other half always updated based on frequencies. In our simula-
tions, we documented the ﬁxation probability of behaviour A or B
after the introduction of a single B mutant in a population of A
players. Figure 4 shows the outcome of simulations after an
average of 20 updates per individual (in correspondence to the
number of rounds in the experiments). In three out of four
contexts, the existence of individual variation in social learning
strategies considerably affects the outcome of cultural evolution.
In the coordination game, payoff-based and frequency-based
learning both disfavour the spread of rare behaviours, so B will be
rapidly lost both in homogeneous and heterogeneous popula-
tions. In the best choice context, a newly introduced superior
technology (B) is more likely to reach ﬁxation in heterogeneous
populations; payoff-based learners readily adopt B, and the
increase in frequency of B reduces the risk that the superior
technology disappears due to frequency-based learning or sto-
chastic processes (for example, copying errors). The same logic
applies to the social dilemma: a newly introduced ‘cheater’
mutant will obtain higher payoffs, and payoff-based learners in a
heterogeneous population will readily switch to defection; once
cooperators are no longer in the majority, frequency-based lear-
ners start defecting and cooperation is lost. In the evasion game,
variation in social learning strategies enhances the stability of the
coexistence of A and B. When assuming the same noise on
payoffs as in the primary experiment, the mean time until ﬁxation
of either behaviour is increased by 50% in groups that are het-
erogeneous with respect to social learning strategies, compared
with homogenous groups. When payoffs are less noisy the
strength of this effect increases, further stabilizing the coexistence
of different behaviours. The emerging role differentiation can
thus increase average payoffs in a group. Interestingly, in het-
erogeneous populations, social learning strategies become corre-
lated with behaviour in this game (playing A or B; see
Supplementary Figure 8, and Supplementary Note 1 for model
details and additional model analyses).
Discussion
Cross-cultural experiments have established that human social
behaviour strongly varies between cultures32,33. This suggests that
considering the behaviour of typical (‘WEIRD’34) participants in
decision making experiments is likely to lead to an
underestimation of the variation present in the human
population. Our experiment shows that even within such a
relatively homogeneous sample of subjects there is strong and
consistent variation in the way people behave. The pronounced
individual differences in social learning strategies we report
emphasize that the average behaviour in a group or population is
far from representative for the behaviour of its constituent
individuals. Furthermore, our simulation model suggests that
individual variation can affect the dynamics and outcome of
social interactions. Although individual differences have been at
the heart of personality research in psychology (for example, ref.
35), they are often disregarded in many other areas of the social
sciences. Our results strongly suggest that individual differences
need to be taken seriously, both in theoretical models and in the
analysis of empirical data. More speciﬁcally, we advocate that
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Figure 3 | Individual consistency across contexts in reliance on social
information and reliance on payoff information. (a) For each of the four
contexts, we categorized subjects according to their reliance on social
learning as low (o0.25) or high (40.25), resulting in a quadruple of low-
high values. The observed fraction of individuals with consistent (‘always
high’ or ‘always low’) reliance on social learning is signiﬁcantly larger than
expected on the basis of independence across contexts (w2¼ 24.725,
d.f.¼ 1, n¼ 128, Po0.001). (b) Similarly, subjects were categorized for each
context according to their reliance on payoffs in social learning (lowo0.5,
and high Z0.5). The observed fraction of individuals with consistent
reliance on payoffs is signiﬁcantly larger than expected (w2¼ 20.436,
d.f.¼ 1, n¼ 128, Po0.001). The ﬁgure also shows the observed and
expected frequency of ‘sensible switchers’ (individuals categorized as high
in the best choice context and as low in the three social contexts). In both a
and b, the ‘other’ category contains the remaining combinations of low-high
values, none of which had a frequency 40.1.
Best choice
0.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.5 1.0
Social dilemma Coordination Evasion
Homogeneous
Heterogeneous
Fixation of A Fixation of B No fixation
Figure 4 | Effect of diversity in social learning strategies on the outcome of cultural evolution. For each of the four contexts, we simulated groups of
eight individuals that were allowed to update their behaviour using payoff-based or frequency-based learning (tendencies to copy either successful or
popular behaviour, respectively). Pairs of bars present the state of the groups after 160 iterations (corresponding to the 20 rounds of our experiments)
when initialized with one B player in a group of A players (105 replicates each). The top row of bars shows the outcome in homogeneous groups,
where each individual uses either form of learning with equal probability. The bottom row of bars shows the outcome in case of heterogeneous groups,
where four individuals always use payoff-based learning, while the four others always use frequency-based learning. Individual variation can cause groups
to adopt superior technologies (option B) more readily in a best choice context, but cooperation (option A) tends to be less stable in a social dilemma.
Moreover, in heterogeneous groups, A and B coexist more stably in an evasion game.
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models of cultural evolution take individual differences in social
learning strategies into account.
In the best choice context, the availability of social information
was associated with an increase in the adoption of the optimal
behaviour. This is in line with earlier ﬁndings in the experimental
and theoretical literature that social learning can increase an
individual’s performance in non-social contexts3,9,26. The way in
which social information was used in this context substantially
differed between individuals, which is in agreement with earlier
experimental evidence24,26. Our experimental results indicate that
individual variation in social learning strategies is even more
pronounced in social contexts, where payoffs depend on the
behaviour of others.
Of course, the results of highly stylized experimental study like
ours should not be over-interpreted. Decision-making experi-
ments in a lab setting allow for a high degree of control, but
inevitably abstract from potentially important aspects of reality.
Although our experimental design imposed relatively few
restrictions on how individuals could track their social environ-
ment, our study does not account for a variety of factors that play
a role in real-life cultural transmission. For instance, it was
impossible for subjects to bias their attention towards older, more
experienced or more dominant peers21,36,37, and active teaching38
was excluded by design. Also, subjects were unable to control the
accessibility of information about their own behaviour and
payoffs27. Moreover, subjects in our experiment were informed
about the general structure of the interaction contexts in which
they were interacting. In reality, this structure is typically unclear
and people have to base their decisions on their best guess of how
their behaviours and the behaviour of others affect their payoffs.
More speciﬁc to our design including different contexts, subjects
in a session always encountered the simplest (non-social) best
choice situation ﬁrst and subsequently interacted in the other
(social) contexts in random order. Some of these concerns can be
addressed by additional experiments. Still, whereas laboratory
experiments can unravel interesting features of human behaviour,
they only present a ﬁrst step: these aspects should subsequently be
scrutinized under more realistic conditions.
Assuming that the individual variation found in our study is
‘real’, why should individuals differ in their learning strategies
and why should they be consistent in their use of social
information across different contexts? Possible explanations can
be found in the literature on ‘animal personalities’. In recent
years, evidence has accumulated that consistent individual
differences in behaviour (‘behavioural syndromes’ or ‘personal-
ities’) are not only prevalent in humans, but also exist throughout
the animal kingdom39,40. In the past, it has often been assumed
that selection on behaviour should result in a single, optimally
adapted phenotype. By studying animal personalities, it has
become apparent that a variety of mechanisms (reviewed in ref.
41) can lead to the evolutionary emergence of consistent
individual variation in behaviour. More speciﬁc models based
on this theoretical framework predict the coexistence of
alternative life history strategies42,43; the coexistence of
individuals differing strongly in responsiveness and social
sensitivity44,45; and the coexistence of different communication
strategies46. These results may serve as a useful starting point for
understanding the consistent individual differences in social
learning strategies observed in this study. Cognitive constraints
and incomplete information on the learning context will often
prevent the evolution of learning strategies that are optimal in
every possible circumstance. Instead, evolution may result in the
coexistence of locally suboptimal but cognitively ‘cheap’ strategies
using rules-of-thumb (for example, ref. 47) such as payoff-based
learning or frequency-based learning. Other mechanisms
facilitating the coexistence of behavioural strategies may apply
to social learning as well. For example, the beneﬁts of information
are often negatively frequency dependent: the value of
information decreases when more individuals also have this
information. This immediately explains why individuals relying
heavily on information coexist with others that are seemingly not
interested in gathering information at all44. Last, but not least, the
coexistence of learning strategies could be explained by ‘synergy’
between different forms of learning. As suggested by our
simulation model, group heterogeneity with respect to learning
strategies may under some circumstances lead to more efﬁcient
outcomes. Such synergetic effects might again induce negative
frequency-dependent selection and result in the coexistence of
alternative learning strategies.
Even if different learning strategies do coexist, one might expect
that individuals are ﬂexible and employ different strategies in
different contexts. Again, the literature on animal personalities has
revealed various mechanisms explaining a more rigid behaviour,
corresponding to the consistent use of the same type of behaviour
in different contexts. Behavioural consistency can be favoured
when strategic conventions are establishing48 or when behaviour
serves as a signal to others. For example, already a small fraction of
‘socially responsive’ individuals in a population may exert a strong
selection pressure in favour of consistency45. Consistency can also
be supported by all kinds of positive feedbacks: individuals can
increase their performance with the consistent use of a certain
social learning strategy, due to an increased efﬁciency in the
collection, interpretation and application of the kind of
information as they get more experienced in using this strategy.
Rather than explaining individual variation from an evolutionary
perspective, scholars of human personality have focused on
characterizing the structure of individual differences. This has
resulted in a number of models that aim to describe human
personality along a few dimensions (the ‘Five Factor Model’49 being
best-known example). It is not unlikely that the observed variation
in social learning strategies is associated with these dimensions or
factors, and this possibility presents an interesting objective for
further research. For instance, one might predict that reliance on
social information is associated with openness or with an orientation
towards collectivism (as opposed to individualism50); in fact, this
latter association has recently been reported by Toelch and
colleagues51. Similarly, one might expect that individuals who
focus on payoff-information are inclined to behave more
competitively (rather than cooperatively) in social interactions.
To our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence showing how
social learning strategies themselves transmit between individuals.
As a result, a discussion about the origin of the individual
differences we report is highly speculative. In humans as well as in
other animals, personality traits often have a high heritability52,53,
and the same might apply to social learning strategies. The
expression of social learning strategies may be strongly affected by
the environmental conditions during individual development.
When parents and their offspring grow up in different environ-
ments, their orientations towards individualism/collectivism can
differ substantially54, and the same could be the case for social
learning strategies. Such plasticity is possible even in case of a strong
genetic basis, provided that the expressed learning strategy reﬂects a
heritable norm of reaction (where the genotype determines how a
trait is expressed in response to the environment41,55). In humans,
parents often have a strong inﬂuence on the development of
social tendencies in their children56, and this might also apply to
social learning. In other words, social learning strategies might
themselves be acquired through social learning57. If individuals
do indeed differ systematically and consistently in their social
learning strategies (as our study suggests), carefully designed
cross-generational studies could provide valuable insights into the
origins of these differences.
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Another interesting future direction would be to address
whether the presence of individual differences in social learning
strategies affects the behavioural dynamics of a group (as
predicted by our simulation model). One could experimentally
test this by creating groups of individuals assorted according to
their social learning strategies, and comparing these homo-
geneous groups to unassorted (heterogeneous) groups. Another
interesting question that could be tested in such a setup is
whether the behavioural dynamics are different between groups
that are homogeneous for different social learning strategies (such
as payoff-based learning and frequency-based learning). For
example, one might expect that a group of payoff-based learners
more readily adopts new superior technologies, whereas groups of
frequency-based learners are faster in reaching equilibrium in a
coordination context.
Methods
In eight independent sessions of our ﬁrst experiment (the ‘primary experiment’),
we confronted sixteen subjects (n¼ 128) with four settings (‘contexts’). In each
context, the subjects had to make choices between two options A or B, but the
contexts differed in the way payoffs depended on the subject’s own decision and
the decisions of others. We based our design on the experimental paradigm of
McElreath et al.24, and we extended this setup to include interactions in the three
strategically different classes of games with pure strategies16, each of which has
been extensively researched in the literature on the evolution of cooperation58.
Each subject sequentially encountered a best choice (BC) situation where one
option (B) yields on average a higher payoff; a social dilemma (SD) where one
option (A) increases the payoffs of all group members but in each situation yields
a lower payoff than the other option (B) for each individual employing it; a
coordination game (CO), where the payoff of each option (A or B) increases
with the number of subjects employing this option; and an evasion game (EV),
where the payoff of either option (A or B) decreases with the number of subjects
choosing this option. The best choice context corresponds to a non-social
(technological) decision situation, while the other three contexts represent different
types of social settings.
Decision making was formulated as planting crops on the land of an imaginary
farm. In each of the twenty rounds of each interaction context, subjects could
decide which of two crops they would plant on their farm (we used actual crop
names, but for simplicity we will refer to the options as A and B). Payoffs were
noisy, so that it would require several trials to ﬁnd out which option was better (see
below for details). In each round, subjects had to decide simultaneously and
anonymously for one of the two options. Before making their decisions, subjects
could pay a small cost to collect information about their peers. The information
available about each peer included the previous decision, previous payoff and the
total payoff acquired in the current context. If a subject chose to collect
information, she could freely request up to six pieces of information. For example,
a subject might request all three types of information of two (out of seven) of her
peers, or she might request only the previous decision of six of her peers. At the
end of each round, subjects were informed about their own payoff in that round.
As a benchmark, we ran four control sessions with sixteen subjects each (n¼ 64),
in which subjects could not collect social information from their peers before
making their decision. Otherwise, the setup of these sessions was identical to the
setup of our primary experiment. In Supplementary Fig. 1, we report on the
ﬁndings of the control sessions.
To check for the replicability and robustness of the results obtained, we also
conducted a second experiment (the ‘follow-up experiment’), consisting of 10
sessions with 20 subjects each (n¼ 200). The basic setup of this follow-up
experiment was the same as the primary experiment reported in the main text: we
confronted participants with four interaction contexts in sequence, each consisting
of a block of 20 rounds. In each round, subjects made a decision between two
options, and, before making their decision, subjects could collect social information
about their peers. However, there were a few differences with the primary
experiment. First, subjects interacted in groups of ﬁve instead of eight; second,
because the group size was not the same, the payoff matrices were changed (see
below); third, the stochastic component of the payoffs was larger (also, see below);
fourth, the maximum number of pieces of information subjects could collect in a
round was limited to four, instead of six; ﬁnally, subjects could no longer request
information about the total payoffs of their group members, but only about their
previous decisions and previous payoffs.
Earnings and experimental details. In total, we ran 22 independent experimental
sessions with n¼ 396 subjects. Subjects were recruited using the database of the
Sociological Laboratory of the University of Groningen. Participation was by
informed consent, and the experimental setup was approved by the Sociological
Laboratory of the University of Groningen. Subjects (132 male, 264 female; aged 18
to 31, mean age 22) were mostly undergraduate students from the social sciences,
economics and biology. Experimental sessions lasted around 90min, in which
subjects earned h29.60 on average according to their performance, excluding a
show-up fee of h5.
Instructions were handed out in the reception room of the laboratory and read
out loud by one of the experimenters. Each participant received a randomly chosen
number corresponding to a desk in the laboratory. Before the experiment itself
started, subjects played a test trial of ﬁve rounds, making them familiar with the
decision-making environment. After that, four blocks of 20 rounds were started,
each presenting a different context of social interaction. At the beginning of each
block of rounds, speciﬁc instructions for the upcoming interaction context were
given on the computer screen and participants had to ﬁll out a brief quiz to check
their understanding (see Supplementary Note 2 for instructions on paper, and on-
screen instructions, including screenshots). Subjects were randomly grouped,
labelled with a number 1–8, and each received 3,000 points to play with (1,000
points¼ 1 euro). During the block of rounds, subjects could make substantial
proﬁts, but subjects could also lose their initial endowment in case of negative
outcomes. After a block of twenty rounds ended, new groups were formed, and
subjects were informed about the payoff structure of the new context (again
followed by a short quiz). Sessions ﬁnished with a questionnaire including items
about personal demographic background. Participants were paid individually in the
reception room. The experiment was conducted using Z-Tree59; code is available
upon request.
Subjects were always confronted with the ‘best choice’ context ﬁrst. Starting
with this most simple interaction context facilitated the subjects’ understanding of
the context they were in and how their decisions affected their payoffs. The three
other interaction contexts–in which payoffs depended on the decisions of others–
were played in randomized order. These other contexts correspond to the three
different classes of games: a social dilemma, a coordination game and an evasion
game.
Interaction contexts. Each of the interaction contexts was characterized by a
payoff matrix
a b
c d
 
. This means that the deterministic component of the
payoff of a subject choosing A and B was given by p  aþ (1 p)  b and p  cþ
(1 p)  d, respectively, where p denotes the relative frequency with which A is
chosen in the group. The payoff matrices were chosen such that at p¼ 0.5, the
payoff difference between A and B was equal in each of the interaction contexts.
In the best choice context (BC), a subjects’ payoff did not depend on the
decisions of the other subjects in their group (a¼ b and c¼ d); the payoff matrix
was given by
50 50
300 300
 
. Irrespective of the behaviour of the other players,
option B yielded higher payoffs on average. In game theoretical terms, B dominates
A and therefore p ¼ 0 is the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot version of the
‘game’.
In the social dilemma (SD), cooperation (A) is dominated by defection (B): aoc
and bod; the payoff matrix was given by 300  250
600 0
 
. Therefore, like in the
best choice context, p ¼ 0 was the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot version of the
game. However, all subjects obtain a higher payoff when they all cooperated
(p¼ 1), compared with this equilibrium (a4d). This shows that, in this context,
collective interests and individual interests are opposed to each other, like in the
famous (two-player) Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
In the coordination game (CO), the payoff of choosing one of the two options
increased with the number of others also choosing it (a4c and bod). The payoff
matrix was given by
175  75
 75 675
 
. In this case, both p ¼ 0 and p ¼ 1 are
Nash equilibria. However, the Nash equilibrium at p ¼ 0 is Pareto superior; the
payoff to all players was higher compared with the equilibrium at p ¼ 1. There was
an (dynamically unstable) equilibrium located at p ¼ (d b)/(a b cþ d). In
this equilibrium (in our case, when two subjects chose A and six subjects chose B),
the expected payoffs of choosing A and choosing B were equal, but any deviation
from this equilibrium leads towards either of the Nash equilibria. Typical examples
of coordination games are the Stag-hunt game and the Battle of the Sexes60.
In the evasion game (EV), the payoff of choosing one of the two options
decreased with the number of others also choosing it (ao c and b4d). The payoff
matrix was given by
 75 175
675  75
 
. In this case, there was a Nash equilibrium
given by equation p ¼ (d b)/(a b cþ d), where, in our case, two subjects
choose A and six subjects choose B. Typical examples of evasion games are the
Hawk-Dove game and the Snowdrift game61.
In the follow-up experiment, the interaction contexts were characterised by the
following payoff matrices: best choice:
100 100
300 300
 
, social dilemma:
400  200
600 0
 
, coordination game
500  300
 300 900
 
, evasion
game
 300 500
900  300
 
. As in the primary experiment, we chose the parameters
such that, at p¼ 0.5, the payoff differences between A and B are equal (that is, 200)
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in each of the interaction contexts. In the coordination game, the unstable
equilibrium was situated where three players choose A and two players choose B.
The Nash equilibrium of the one-shot version of the evasion game was situated
where two players chose A and three chose B. All other equilibria were the same as
in the primary experiment.
Payoffs were noisy, reﬂecting the fact that the outcome of behaviour is often
inﬂuenced by exogenous factors. This noise made it harder for the subjects to ﬁnd
out individually which choice was optimal, and, as a consequence, made social
information more valuable. Noise was implemented by adding a stochastic term to
the deterministic component of the payoffs of each subject separately. This
stochastic component was a number drawn from a normal distribution with mean
0 and s.d. s.
In the primary experiment, we set s¼ 175, so that at p¼ 0.5, choosing the
option with the lower expected payoff nevertheless leads to higher payoffs in 16%
of the cases. In the follow-up experiment, the stochastic component on the subjects’
payoffs was relatively larger than in our primary experiment (s¼ 200). This
implies that at p¼ 0.5, choosing the inferior option nevertheless leads to higher
payoffs in 24% of the cases.
Simulation details. Details of the model of cultural evolution can be found in
Supplementary Note 1.
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